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1 Introduction
The eﬀects of knowledge spillovers from workers’ mobility have recently attracted a lot
of attention in various disciplines, coinciding with the suggestion that one of the key
ingredients of Silicon Valley’s success is the high labor turnover of engineers and software
programmers (Saxenian, 1994).1 According to this argument, knowledge spillovers among
firms located in the same district stimulate innovation and economic growth.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the eﬀect upon innovations of trade se-
cret laws and contractual clauses that limit workers’ mobility, an issue that has already
attracted the attention of legal scholars (Gilson, 1999; Hyde, 2001).
There are diﬀerent ways in which the law might protect firms’ knowledge from misap-
propriation by former employees. (We refer here to knowledge that cannot be protected
by patents and copyright laws.) First, trade secret laws theoretically protect firms’ valu-
able information when an employee leaves. However, these laws are not easily enforceable,
apart from cases where the trade secret can be easily identified (a formula, or customer
lists) and misappropriation easily observed (theft, espionage, or an employee walking away
with documents). Most of the trade secrets of a firm consist of tacit knowledge, and it
is very diﬃcult to draw the line between the general knowledge that an employee has
received through his education, background, and work experience, and the specific knowl-
edge that he has received from an employer and that one could classify as a trade secret.2
Accordingly, firms find it hard to prove that there is misappropriation of trade secrets
when employees move to other firms.
To overcome the diﬃculties of trade secret laws, firms might adopt post-employment
covenants not to compete (CNCs). These covenants establish that an employee cannot
- after termination of his contract with a given employer - work for a competing firm
for a given period of time (usually, one or two years) and in a given geographical area.3
Therefore, they protect trade secrets by eliminating the very mechanism by which they
are lost, namely workers’ mobility.4
To us, the interesting question is why (actual or potential) labor turnover, or the absence
of contractual clauses that prevent it, should foster innovation. In fact, if firms knew that
an employee might leave the company at any time bringing with him the firm’s knowledge,
they would hardly have an incentive to innovate. The main objective of this paper is
1According to Saxenian (1994, p.34), labor turnover in Silicon Valley’s electronic industry reached 35
percent a year on average during the Seventies.
2 Innovations created by an employee in his working hours also belong to the employer according to
trade secret laws.
3 Such covenants are legally enforceable in most European countries and in many US states, as long as
they are limited in time and place, they do not unreasonably restrict the right of the employee to find a
new job, and protect a legitimate interest of the employer (see among others Hyde, 2001, and Thiébart,
2001). In a few US states, notably California, CNCs are banned.
4A very strict enforcement of trade secret laws might achieve the same objective as CNCs. Some recent
US decisions have adopted the presumption that former employees would inevitably disclose some trade
secrets. This would imply that it is not necessary to establish the existence of a trade secret, and de facto
prohibit employees from moving to competitors. See Gilson (1999), and Hyde (2001, part III, page 5) for
a critique of this doctrine.
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therefore to analyze the ex-ante eﬀects of CNCs in an environment of weak trade secret
laws. Our main result is that when an employee’s eﬀort is crucial for R&D, it is optimal
not to include a CNC in the employment contract. This alleviates a commitment problem
on the side of the firm by forcing it to reward the employee if he makes an innovation (else,
he would leave for another firm). Hence, the employee exerts more eﬀort, which leads to
more innovation.5
Our formalization follows Baker et al. (2002) in assuming that R&D outcomes are
observable but not verifiable. It is notoriously hard to measure objectively the output of
research. Typically, profits from an innovation accrue long after the research is completed,
and they will depend on the eﬀort and talent of the whole organization, from production
to aftersales service. Even if it is hard to measure R&D output objectively, it is often
possible to measure it subjectively. Therefore, there are typically compensation schemes
that do not rely, at least uniquely, on objective measures of R&D success such as patents,
publications, and profits.6
Within this setting, we consider two types of contracts: fixed wage contracts, and
contracts that include a bonus for a successful R&D outcome. First, we show that under
fixed wage contracts, an employee exerts no eﬀort if there is a CNC in place, as there is
no reward for innovating. On the other hand, if there is no CNC, competing firms will
try to ’poach’ a successful employee to acquire the innovation. This raises the wage of
the employee, and provides him with incentives to exert eﬀort. As a result, there is more
innovation without CNCs.
Contrary to what one might expect, repeated interaction between the firm and the
employee does not change this result. A CNC also leads to a lower eﬀort even when
the contract includes a performance bonus (a so-called ’relational contract’). A relational
contract can be sustained only if the employer’s future gain from honoring the contract is
higher than the profit it makes by deviating from it. When there is no CNC included in
the contract, the employee can leave the firm if he is not paid the promised bonus. This
threat decreases the firm’s payoﬀ from deviating and helps to enforce a relational contract
with a higher bonus, resulting in higher eﬀort by the employee and higher profits for the
firm.7
Innovations are often the combined product of employees’ eﬀort and creativity and of
the firm’s investment. We show that CNCs unambiguously reduce profits and innovation
if the employee’s eﬀort is crucial. On the other hand, if the firm’s investment is more
important than the employee’s eﬀort, then CNCs find the rationale for their existence:
5Note that we consider only the ex-ante eﬀects of labor contracts on innovation. For the argument
that knowledge spillovers are beneficial if they are large enough to outweigh the detrimental eﬀects on the
incentives to innovate, see Gilson (1999).
6The compensation to scientists may take many forms, reflecting the fact that scientific personnel
are often as much driven by professional curiosity and recognition as by monetary incentives. Examples
are: promotions, additional R&D funds, freedom to pursue pet projects, luncheons and other recognition
events. See also Chester (1995) on these issues. For an empirical analysis of compensation schemes in
pharmaceutical research, see Cockburn et al. (1999).
7Note that whether the worker actually moves to another firm or not in equilibrium is irrelevant for
our argument. What matters is that the worker receives an outside oﬀer.
2
since they prevent a worker from walking away and bringing knowledge to rivals, such
covenants maintain the appropriability of the firm’s investment and favor innovations.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it belongs to the literature
on implicit contracts initiated by McLeod (1988) and McLeod and Malcomson (1989). Our
debt to Baker et al. (1994, 2002) is especially obvious, and indeed we have tried to keep
our model as close as possible to their formalization and notation to help readers. Our
contribution, relative to theirs, is that we explicitly analyze the role of trade secret laws
and CNCs and formalize the process by which a worker can move to a competing firm.
The diﬀerent extensions analyzed (most importantly, the case of two-sided investment)
were also not considered by Baker et al. (1994, 2002).
Our paper is also closely related to Aghion and Tirole (1994) and the literature on the
eﬃcient allocation of property rights (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986). Aghion and Tirole
(1994) analyze a contractual relationship between a “customer” and a “research unit”,
both investing in research. They show that giving the property rights of the innovation to
the research unit (“non integrated case”) rather than to the customer (“integrated case”)
is optimal if the research unit’s eﬀort is relatively more important than the customer’s
investment in research. Our result showing that a CNC should be included in the contract
only if the firm’s investment matters more that the employee’s eﬀort is clearly of a similar
nature.8 However, Aghion and Tirole did not model workers’ mobility, nor did they study
relational contracts.
This paper also belongs to the law and economics literature on trade secrets and CNCs.
Apart from the above mentioned works by Gilson (1999) and Hyde (2000), it is worth
mentioning Rubin and Shedd (1981) and more recently Posner and Triantis (2001). These
papers study the eﬃciency properties of CNCs in a situation where the firm invests in
the training of its employees and compare CNCs with such alternative remedies as specific
performance and liquidated damages. They therefore focus on complementary issues to
the ones that are at the centre of our paper.
We formalize explicitly the process by which the current employer and a rival firm
compete to keep, or hire, a worker who possesses trade secrets. As such, we follow Pakes
and Nitzan (1983) and other recent papers that explicitly model knowledge spillovers
through labor mobility.9 However, these papers focus on somewhat diﬀerent issues than
the ones analyzed here.
The basic mechanism we emphasize in this paper is similar to the one identified by the
literature on second-sourcing. In Farrell and Gallini (1988), licensing a product amounts
for a monopolist to committing to future competition (otherwise consumers would fear a
lock-in and refrain from buying).10
8See also Hyde (2000) for a critical discussion of the possible application of Aghion and Tirole’s model to
the analysis of CNCs, especially as regards shared ownership rights. Merges (2001) also uses the Grossman
and Hart’s theory to discuss who should own property rights of innovations.
9 See, for example, Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Rønde (2001).
10 See also Padilla and Pagano (1997), where committing to share information among lenders increases
competition and reduces incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviour.
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Burguet et al. (2002) study optimal quitting fees in labor contracts. The productivity
of an employee depends on his ability and the quality of the match. The ability of a worker
is unknown ex-ante, and the parties set the fees as to minimize the rents appropriated ex-
post by outsiders. Quitting fees do not aﬀect the eﬀort exerted and play thus a quite
diﬀerent role from the one of CNCs in our model.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) also explore the idea that giving freedom to an employee may
provide incentives to exert eﬀort. The instrument considered is diﬀerent from ours, as the
principal decides whether to give the agent the formal authority to choose his preferred
project. A related idea is developed in Puga and Trefler (2002) that study innovation in a
system of complements.
Finally, our paper is related to a stream of papers on innovation and start-ups. Lewis
and Yao (2001) study worker and knowledge flows in industrial clusters. They show that
when the labor market is tight, and employees have more bargaining power, firms choose
an open and eﬃcient research environment and more start-ups take place. Cassiman
and Ueda (2002) consider a setup where firms have a limited capacity for R&D projects.
Established firms thus reject profitable projects, which may lead to start-ups by employees.
Both papers study how the legal environment aﬀects the amount of start-ups happening
in equilibrium, but they do not look at employees’ ex-ante incentives, which is our main
focus.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents and solves
the base model where only the worker contributes to the innovation. Section 3 looks at
the general case where both the firm and the employee invest in R&D. In section 4, we
return to the base model and check the robustness of our results by relaxing some of the
assumptions. Reassuringly, under these alternative assumptions the qualitative results
obtained only change marginally. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
To understand the role of covenants not to compete we consider a setup where (general)
trade secret protection is so weak that it provides no protection of the firm’s intellectual
property if a key employee leaves for another firm. Including a CNC in the employment
contract is thus the only way to protect the intellectual property against ’poaching’. In
the next subsection, we describe the game.
2.1 The game
(1) The contract oﬀered At the beginning of the game, Firm 1 oﬀers a contract (s, i, b)
to a risk-neutral employee. (The later analysis is mainly concerned with Firm 1, so we will
refer to it as ’the firm’ when this is unambiguous.) There is a pool of ex-ante identical
candidate employees, so we assume that the firm has all the bargaining power at this stage.
The contract can have both a contractible (explicit) and non-contractible (implicit)
part. s is the fixed wage, which is contractible. In the base model, we assume that the
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employee is not credit constrained, so the fixed wage can be negative. In section 4.2, we
look at contracting with a wealth and credit constrained employee. i = CNC indicates
that a CNC is included in the contract whereas i = ∅ indicates that there is no such clause.
This is, of course, also an explicit part of the contract. If a CNC is included, the employee
cannot work for a competitor within the present period, unless a compensation is paid to
Firm 1.11
The actions of the employee are not observable, but the resulting outcome is observable,
although not contractible (that is, not verifiable in court). b > 0 is a bonus that the firm
promises to pay if the employee’s actions lead to a successful outcome. However, since the
outcome is not verifiable, the firm is not legally obliged to pay the bonus. The promise of
a bonus is thus only kept if the contract is self-enforcing, as we see below.
Notice that we do not consider incentive schemes where the reward depends on the
profits realized by the firm, like, e.g., an equity stake. This is mainly a simplifying as-
sumption and it is supposed to capture the idea that the employee has little influence on
the overall profits of the firm.12
In each period, there is a R&D stage and, if there is an innovation, a marketing stage.
The following figure illustrates the timing in each period. The individual steps are ex-
plained in detail below.
R&D Stage Marketing Stage
1. The employee accepts/rejects 
contract,
2. The employee chooses effort,
3. R&D outcome realized,
4. Bonus offered (under relational contract),
5. Employee accepts/rejects bonus,
6. Competition for the employee (no CNC and no bonus)/ 
offer from Firm 2 (otherwise),
7. Product marketed and profits realized.
Figure 1. The timing within a period.
(2) The research stage First, the employee decides whether to accept the contract or
not.13 If he rejects the oﬀer, then he works elsewhere in the economy and receives a salary
of wa (the reservation wage). For simplicity, we assume wa = 0.14 If the employee accepts
11After the first market realisation, the current innovation loses value. Therefore, we can restrict our
attention to one-period covenants.
12 In other words, we do not consider the component β of the compensation scheme analysed by Baker
et al. (1994, 2002).
13Here, there is a diﬀerence between the first and later periods. In the first period, the employee accepts
or rejects the contract. In later periods, he decides whether to continue working for the firm given the
conditions of the contract. In most of the paper, however, the employee earns zero every period, so this
diﬀerence between the first and the later periods is inessential.
14Baker et al. (1994) show that the value of the reservation wage aﬀects the sustainability of the
relational contracts. In a previous draft of the paper we have analysed the case where wa ≥ 0, and found
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the oﬀer, he takes an action a, which is the probability that the action leads to a successful
outcome, namely an innovation. With a probability 1− a, the action leads to an outcome
of value 0 for the firm (no innovation). This action has a cost γa2 for the employee. We
will refer to a as the employee’s ’eﬀort’.15
Finally, at the end of the research stage, the outcome of the employee’s eﬀort is observed
by all relevant agents in the economy (section 4.5 briefly discusses the case of asymmetric
information). We assume that an innovation has only commercial value for one period.
Afterwards, it either becomes obsolete or is imitated by competitors. Suppose first that
the employee is unsuccessful. Then, no bonus is oﬀered and the employee continues in the
firm (whether he stays or leaves is immaterial). The game continues to the next period.
On the other hand, if the employee is successful, there is a marketing stage.
(3) The marketing stage If there is a CNC, the timing is the following. Firm 1
decides whether to oﬀer a bonus. If a bonus is oﬀered, the employee accepts it, as he
has no other possibility of capitalizing on the innovation. Afterwards, although the CNC
prevents the employee from leaving, Firm 1 might decide to let him go if it receives a
suitable compensation in exchange. Therefore, Firm 2 decides whether it wants to make
an oﬀer to Firm 1 to hire the employee. This oﬀer is either accepted or rejected.
If there is no CNC, the timing is similar. First, Firm 1 decides whether to oﬀer the
bonus, b. Next, the employee decides on whether to accept or reject the bonus. If the
employee accepts the bonus, he has to stay until after market realization. If the employee
rejects the bonus, or no bonus is oﬀered, the firms compete for the employee’s services.
We model the hiring process, which is discussed in detail in point 5 below, as a first price
auction.
The profits depend on whether the employee stays with Firm 1. If the employee stays,
Firm 1 can market the innovation as a monopolist. The gross monopoly profits (i.e. gross of
wages) are normalized to 1. If the employee leaves, we assume that both firms can market
the innovation. The underlying assumption is that the innovation remains within Firm
1, so it needs only to hire a ’production’ employee (at the reservation wage) to produce
(see footnote 32 for a discussion of the case where the innovation is the employee’s private
information). In case the employee leaves, Firm 1 and 2 thus both earn gross duopoly
profits of φ, φ ≤ 1.
(4) Infinite repetition of the game The game continues like in 2-3 every period for
an infinite number of periods.16 There is no discounting within a period, but a discount
that it does not aﬀect the comparison between CNCs and no-CNCs. Since assuming zero reservation wage
makes the analysis considerably neater, we adopt this assumption.
15Of course, one should interpret a as the eﬀort made by the employee above a minimal eﬀort which can
be specified contractually (number of hours worked, verifiable tasks to be performed, and so on). Therefore,
when we talk of ’zero eﬀort’ which leads to ’zero profits’, these terms need not be taken literally.
16We assume that innovations are non-cumulative: the probability of getting an innovation in the
following period(s) is the same no matter what has happened in the present period. This, admittedly
strong, assumption simplifies the analysis greatly, and relaxing it is unlikely to change the analysis of
CNCs qualitatively.
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rate of r between periods.
(5) The competition for the employee The competition for the employee, if there is
no CNC and the bonus is rejected, is modeled as a first price auction (section 4.3 discusses
alternative bargaining assumptions). We will here describe the auction and derive the
static Nash equilibrium for future reference. The first step is to find the value of the
employee for the firms. There is a pool of identical employees that the firms can hire from.
The value of the employee stems only from the innovation that he has made.
If Firm 1 loses the employee it gets φ whereas it gets 1 if it keeps him. Hence, its
willingness to pay is 1− φ. Firm 2 gets φ if it hires the employee and 0 otherwise. Hence,
its willingness to pay is φ. As tie-breaking rule, we assume throughout the paper that the
firm with the highest valuation hires the employee. This ensures an equilibrium in pure
strategies. Furthermore, we do not consider equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. This
implies that the firm with the higher willingness to pay will get the employee by paying
a wage equal to the valuation of the other. Therefore, Firm 1 will keep the employee (no
job turnover arises) if 1− φ ≥ φ, or φ ≤ 1/2. In this section, we restrict our attention to
φ ≤ 1/2, but φ > 1/2 is analyzed in section 4.1. We will say that the ‘eﬃciency eﬀect’
holds if φ ≤ 1/2.17
Suppose first that no CNC is in place and the bonus (if oﬀered) has been rejected.
Since φ ≤ 1/2, the employee stays with Firm 1 and receives a wage equal to φ. Suppose
instead that there is a CNC. Here, the employee also stays, as Firm 2 cannot profitably
pay Firm 1 enough to compensate for the loss incurred if the employee leaves.
2.2 Spot and relational contracts
We are now ready to analyze the complete model. We consider two types of contracts.
First, we look at employment contracts containing only explicit elements, i.e., the fixed
wage, s, and possibly a CNC. Following Baker et al. (2002), we denote these ’spot con-
tracts’. Afterwards, we consider contracts where an implicit bonus, b, is added to the
contract. These are called ’relational contracts’ as they only can be sustained in a long-
term relation. Therefore, a contract (s, i, 0) is ’Spot’ and a contract (s, i, b > 0) is
’Relational’.
We denote Vi,j as the per period profits, where i ∈ {CNC, ∅} and j ∈ {S(pot), R(elational)}.
V ∗i,j denotes the equilibrium profits. Finally, U(a) is the utility of the employee in the rel-
evant period as a function of a (the probability that an action results in an innovation).
Before turning to the diﬀerent contracts, we first analyze a benchmark case where it is
possible to contract upon the outcome of the employee’s eﬀort.
17 In the industrial organization literature, the term “eﬃciency eﬀect” has been used to describe a
situation where the monopoly profit is higher than the sum of the duopoly profits. See for instance Tirole
(1988, page 348-50).
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2.2.1 Benchmark: first best
As a benchmark, it is useful to find the optimal contract when the outcome of the R&D
is contractible. The firm can thus commit to paying a bonus if an innovation is made.
Suppose the employee is oﬀered the contract (b, s, CNC). Assuming that the employee
accepts the contract, he chooses the a that maximizes his utility U(a) = ab − γa2 + s,
which gives the solution a = b/(2γ).
The problem of the firm is to maximize its profits subject to the participation and
incentive constraint of the employee:
max
b,s
{(1− b)a− s} subject to: ab+ s− γa2 ≥ 0 and a = b/(2γ).
which can be rewritten, after noting that the participation constraint is binding, as:
maxb{b(1 − b/2)/(2γ)}. The solution is bfb = 1, sfb = −1/(4γ), and afb = 1/(2γ);
the firm’s profit is V fb = 1/(4γ). It can easily be verified that this is also the outcome if it
is possible to contract directly on a. The bonus bfb is greater than the outside oﬀer φ, so
the employee always accepts the bonus and stays with the firm. Therefore, it is irrelevant
whether a CNC is included in the contract.
In order to avoid corner-solutions, we assume that γ > 1/2. This ensures that a is
smaller than 1 in equilibrium.
2.2.2 Spot contracts
We now turn to the case where it is not possible to contract upon the outcome of the
innovation. We first look at spot contracts (s, i, 0).
A covenant not to compete Suppose first that there is a CNC. Since the employee
cannot leave, he cannot rely on outside oﬀers to increase his wage after an innovation.
His problem is: maxa U(a) = (s − γa2), leading to the optimal eﬀort a = 0. The firm
anticipates that the employee makes zero eﬀort and pays him no more than s = 0. Firm
1’s expected payoﬀ in this case is
V ∗CNC,S = 0. (1)
No covenant Suppose now that no CNC is included in the employment contract. From
the analysis of the hiring process in the previous subsection, we know that if the eﬀort leads
to an innovation, the firm will pay φ to the employee to make him stay. The employee’s
expected payoﬀ at the moment of deciding his eﬀort is therefore U(a) = (s + aφ − γa2),
leading to optimal eﬀort a = φ/(2γ).
The problem of Firm 1 is to find the optimal fixed salary given the anticipation that
the employee earns φ from an innovation. Hence, it solves:
max
s
V∅,S(s) = a(1− φ)− s subject to: s+ aφ− γa2 ≥ 0 and a = φ/(2γ),
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where the first constraint ensures the participation of the employee. Clearly, this problem
is solved by paying him a salary that will give him the reservation wage, that is: s =
−aφ+ γa2 = −φ2/(4γ). The expected profits of Firm 1 are:
V ∗∅,S =
φ(2− φ)
4γ . (2)
Note that the fixed wage is lower than the reservation wage (i.e., negative). Firm 1 is
able to appropriate all monetary rents as the employee is risk-neutral and is not credit and
wealth constrained.18
From the discussion above, the next lemma follows immediately:
Lemma 1 If only spot contracts are available, it is optimal not to include a covenant not
to compete in the employment contract.
Under spot contracting, the firm does not reward a successful employee if there is a
covenant in the contract. If there is no covenant, the firm is forced to pay at least some
reward to the successful employee (as he otherwise leaves for a competitor). Letting the
employee be free to leave thus partly overcomes the commitment problem of the firm, and
this is the intuition why it is optimal not to include a CNC in the contract.
2.2.3 Relational contracts
A covenant not to compete Let us start with the case where a CNC exists. Recall
that under a relational contract, Firm 1 promises to pay the employee a bonus, b, if
an innovation is made. Suppose that the employee expects the bonus to be paid. The
optimal eﬀort is found from the program: maxa U(a) = s + ab − γa2, which leads to
a(b) = b/(2γ). The firm oﬀers the employee the wage that just satisfies his participation
constraint: s(b) = −b2/(4γ). (Note that sofar the role of b is precisely the same as φ in
the analysis above.) The per period payoﬀ of the firm, as a function of b, is:
VCNC,R(b) = a(b)(1− b)− s(b) =
b(1− b)
2γ +
b2
4γ =
b(2− b)
4γ
However, the key issue here is to understand whether the implicit contract is self-
sustainable or not. Indeed, VCNC,R(b) can be the payoﬀ only if the employee anticipates
that the firm will pay the bonus. Else, he makes zero eﬀort. Let us look then at the
incentive constraint of the firm. The firm, after observing an innovation, has to compare
the payoﬀs from paying the bonus and from reneging.
We consider an equilibrium sustained by ’grim’ trigger strategies. We assume that
if the firm deviates and chooses not to pay the bonus, it loses its reputation not only
with the current employee but also with all potential employees: in any future period,
18 If either one of these two assumptions is relaxed, some of the monetary rents will go to the employee.
See section 4.2.
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an employee will accept only spot contracts.19 ,20 After a deviation, the firm has thus to
use spot contracts in all future. It prefers then to give up the covenant, as this gives a
higher payoﬀ under spot contracting.21 Therefore, the firm’s incentive constraint (IC) is
determined by the following condition:
(1− b) + VCNC,R(b)r ≥ 1 +
V ∗∅,S
r ,
where the left hand side (LHS) are the profits of the firm if it pays the bonus, and the
right hand side (RHS) are the profits if it deviates, pays no bonus, and continues with spot
contracting and no CNC. Therefore, the problem of the firm is (after rewriting the IC):
max
b
VCNC,R(b) subject to: VCNC,R(b) ≥ rb+ V ∗∅,S
The objective function finds its maximum in the unconstrained problem for bfb = 1
(that leads to the first best eﬀort afb = 1/2γ). However, the constraint might be binding,
or there could be no value of b satisfying it. The following proposition summarizes the
solution of this program:
Lemma 2 (Relational contract and a covenant not to compete)
For 1/2 ≥ φ, the optimal relational contract with a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ (1−φ)
2
4γ ≡ brfb, then b∗ = 1 (the relational contract attains first best).
ii. If brfb < r ≤ 1−√φ(2−φ)2γ ≡ bro, then b∗ = bb = 1 − 2γr +q(1− 2γr)2 − φ(2− φ) (the
relational contract attains second best).
iii. If r > bro, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Proof. For b∗ = 1, the incentive constraint is V (1) = 1/(4γ) ≥ r+ φ(2− φ)/(4γ), which
is satisfied iﬀ. r ≤ brfb. For higher values of r, b∗ does not satisfy the incentive constraint.
Therefore, the firm chooses the highest possible value of b that satisfies the incentive
constraint with equality. This is a standard second order equation, whose higher root isbb = 1− 2γr +q(1− 2γr)2 − φ(2− φ). This root exists only if (1− 2γr)2 − φ(2− φ) > 0,
i.e. r ≤ bro.
Lemma 2 states only the optimal bonus, but the corresponding eﬀort and fixed wage
are easily derived from the incentive and participation constraint of the employee. Note
that when the relational contract is feasible, the firm always prefers it over spot contracts.
19Hyde brings an illustration of such a reputation mechanism at play
(http://www.andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hyde/WEALTH3.htm). Intel sued in 1989 Chan, an engi-
neer, for having misappropriated some of Intel’s intellectual property related to the 80387 mathematical
co-processor. This was a highly unusual step in Silicon Valley, and was perceived as unfair by the
community of research engineers. As a result, Intel suﬀered serious recruitment problems. Apparently,
this led Intel to abandon the practice of suing departing employees.
20 If one is not comfortable with the hypothesis of reputational eﬀects in the labor market, one can think
that because of lock-in eﬀects there can be a relationship only between the firm and a particular employee.
After not receiving the bonus, this employee will not be willing to enter a relational contract any longer.
21After a deviation, the firm and the employee renegotiate the contract, as the employee gets a negative
pay-oﬀ under the initial contract in the continuation game following a deviation where no bonus is paid
(the employee would otherwise leave). The employee has no bargaining power, and the firm chooses the
spot contract that maximizes its expected profits.
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This can be observed from the fact that a necessary condition for the incentive constraint
of the firm to hold is VCNC,R(b) ≥ V ∗∅,S (> V ∗CNC,S).
Observe that other things equal, the lower the discount rate r (i.e., the more weight
attached to the future) the more likely that the relational contract can be sustained and
lead to the first best. For intermediate values of the discount rate, a relational contract
can be sustained, but only the second best solution bb can be obtained. If the discount rate
is too large, only the spot contracts arise and the firm gives up the covenant to increase
its payoﬀ.
The following comparative statics result are easily obtained: ∂b∗/∂r ≤ 0 and ∂b∗/∂φ ≤
0. If the interest rate increases, it becomes more attractive for the firm to deviate from the
relational contract because future benefits from the contract (relative to spot contracting)
are valued less. Therefore, the bonus has to decrease to sustain cooperation. Higher
duopoly profits have a similar eﬀect on the equilibrium bonus, as they increase the profits
from deviating through V ∗∅,S .
It is interesting to note that the firm is hurt by the fact that it is able to give up the
CNC after reneging on the relational contract. This increases the payoﬀ from deviating
and makes it harder to sustain the more profitable relational contract.
No covenant Let us now look at the relational contract under the assumption that there
is no covenant. This gives the employee the possibility to get an outside oﬀer (but recall we
assume that he cannot leave if he accepts the bonus). Everything is as above, except that
the employee may threaten to leave if no bonus is paid or it is rejected. The outside oﬀer
is φ. Therefore, the employee only accepts the bonus, and refrains from getting outside
oﬀers, if b ≥ φ. We only consider contracts where the bonus is accepted, as the contract
otherwise is equivalent to a spot contract.
The incentive constraint of the firm is then:
(1− b) + V∅,R(b)r ≥ 1− φ+
V ∗∅,S
r ,
where the LHS are the profits if the bonus is paid, and the RHS are the profits if the firm
deviates, the employee is hired at the wage φ, and the employment is continued under spot
contracting with no CNC.
Proceeding as above, the problem of the firm is:
max
b
V∅,R(b) = VCNC,R(b) =
b(2− b)
4γ subject to: V∅,R(b) ≥ rb− rφ+ V
∗
∅,S and b ≥ φ.
The following proposition summarizes the solutions of the firm’s program:
Lemma 3 (Relational contract and no covenant not to compete)
For 1/2 ≥ φ, the optimal relational contract without a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ (1−φ)4γ ≡ erfb, then b∗ = 1 (the relational contract attains first best).
ii. If erfb < r ≤ (1−φ)2γ ≡ ero, then b∗ = bb = 2 − φ − 4γr (the relational contract attains
11
second best)
iii. If r > ero, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Proof. At b∗ = 1, the incentive constraint is: V∅,R(1) = 1/4γ ≥ r − rφ+ φ(2− φ)/(4γ),
which is satisfied iﬀ r ≤ erfb. For higher values of r, the incentive constraint binds and
the firm chooses the highest bonus solving: b/(2γ) − b2/(4γ) = rb − rφ + φ(2 − φ)/(4γ),
whence bb = 2− φ− 4γr . Since we require that b ≥ φ, it must be that r ≤ (1 − φ)/(2γ).
For higher values of r, there is no solution to the constrained program.
We have as above, and for the same reasons, ∂b∗/∂r ≤ 0 and ∂b∗/∂φ ≤ 0. Comparing
the incentive constraint of the firm with and without a CNC, we see that the constraint
is looser if there is no covenant (the only diﬀerence between the two constraints is φ that
is substracted on the RHS when there is no CNC). The absence of a covenant endows the
employee with the threat to leave the firm. This decreases the payoﬀ of the firm from
deviating, so a relational contract can be sustained for a larger region of parameters and
with higher powered incentives. The next lemma shows this formally.
Lemma 4 For 1/2 ≥ φ, the region of parameters for which a relational contract exists
is larger if there is no covenant not to compete included in the employment contract.
Furthermore, whenever a relational contract exists both with and without a covenant, both
the profits of the firm and the eﬀort of the employee are (weakly) greater with no covenant.
Proof. To prove this proposition, we just have to compare the results obtained in
Lemma 2 and 3. We start by comparing the threshold values. It is straightforward to
show that brfb < erfb and bro < ero. Therefore, if r ∈ (0, brfb], the profits are the same
with and without a covenant, as the first best bonus can be implemented. If (ero,∞),
no relational contract exists (and Lemma 1 establishes that profits are higher if there
is no covenant). If r ∈ (brfb, erfb], it is optimal to have no covenant as this is the only
way that bfb can be implemented. Similarly, if r ∈ (bro, ero], it is optimal not to have a
covenant as there otherwise exists no relational contract. Finally, consider r ∈ (erfb, bro]
where a second best relational contract exists with and without a covenant. Here, the
equilibrium eﬀort under the covenant (bbc) is lower than without the covenant (bbnc): bbc =
1− 2γr+
q
(1− 2γr)2 − φ(2− φ) < bbnc = 2− φ− 4γr. Since Vi,R(b) is increasing in b for
b < 1, it is optimal not to have a covenant in this region.
Combining the previous results, we obtain the following proposition, which is one of
the main results of the paper:
Proposition 1 When the innovation depends only on the employee’s eﬀort, it is always
(weakly) better for the firm not to include a covenant not to compete in the employment
contract.
Proof. There are three situations possible: 1) only spot contracting is possible whether
or not a covenant is included (r ∈ (ero,∞)); 2) a relational contract exists only if there is
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no covenant (r ∈ (bro, ero]); and 3) a relational contract exists with and without a covenant
(r ∈ (0, bro]). Since a relational contract always dominates spot contracts when it exists,
the proof follows directly from Lemma 1 and 1.
This intuition behind this result is, as explained above, that having no covenant alle-
viates the commitment problem of the firm. The firm would like to commit to rewarding
the employee for innovating but doing so is diﬃcult. Under spot contracting, the only
way to credibly promise to reward a successful employee is not to include a CNC. Under
relational contracting, the commitment problem is less severe, as the threat of reversion to
spot contracting makes it costly for the firm to renege on its (implicit) promises. However,
even in a relational contract, it is (weakly) better not to include a CNC, as it relaxes the
incentive constraint of the firm by increasing the cost of deviating.
3 Two-sided investments
In this section, we extend the analysis by considering the case where not only the employee
but also the employer invests in creating the innovation. We therefore modify slightly the
game analyzed sofar by assuming that in the second stage of each period the firm also
makes an investment, I. More specifically, we assume that the probability of an innovation
is λa+(1−λ)I where a and I are the investments of the employee and the firm, respectively.
λ is thus a measure of how important the employee’s investment is relative to the firm’s.
In the extreme cases, if λ = 1, only the employee’s investment matters, whereas if λ = 0
only the firm’s investment matters. The cost of investing is given by γ(i)2 (i = a, I) for
both agents. We assume that φ ≤ 12 and that the employee is not credit constrained.
3.1 Benchmark: first best
We first determine the optimal contract when it is possible to contract upon the worker’s
contribution to the innovation, so the firm can commit to paying b if he is successful. In
this case, at the innovation stage the employee solvesmaxa
©
(λa+ (1− λ)I)b− γ(a)2 + s
ª
,
which leads to the eﬀort a(b) = λb/(2γ); the firm solvesmaxI
©
(λa+ (1− λ)I)(1− b)− γ(I)2 − s
ª
,
resulting in the investment I(b) = (1− λ)(1− b)/(2γ).
The firm maximizes its profit subject to the participation constraint of the employee:
maxb,s
©
(λa(b) + (1− λ)I(b))(1− b)− γ(I(b))2 − s
ª
, subject to s ≥ γ(a(b))2−(λa(b) + (1− λ)I(b)) b.
After substituting and noting that the participation constraint will bind, this can be rewrit-
ten as:
max
b
V (b) ≡
½
λ2b(2− b)
4γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b2)
4γ
¾
.
Solving this problem, we obtain:
bfb(λ) = λ
2
λ2 + (1− λ)2
.
It can be checked that the second order condition is satisfied, so bfb is a global maximum.
It is not possible to increase the incentives of the firm and the employee at the same time,
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as a higher bonus to the employee leads to lower profits for the firm. The optimal bonus
has thus to trade-oﬀ the incentives of the firm and the employee. bfb is increasing in λ,
because the incentives of the employee become more important (relative to the firm’s)
when the employee contributes more to the innovation.
3.2 Spot contracts
3.2.1 Covenant not to compete
Suppose first that there is a CNC, so the employee cannot leave following an innovation.
Under spot contracting, the firm does not pay the employee extra if there is an innovation.
Therefore, as in the base model, we have: a = s = 0. The firm receives profits of 1 if it
innovates. The problem of the firm can thus be written as maxI VCNC,S = (1−λ)I−γ(I)2,
which results in I = (1− λ)/(2γ) and V ∗CNC,S = V (0) = (1− λ)2/(4γ).
3.2.2 No covenant
We now turn to the case where there is no CNC. In equilibrium, the firm pays φ to the
employee if there is an innovation to avoid him leaving. The employee makes the eﬀort
a = λφ/(2γ), and the firm extracts all expected rents by oﬀering s = −λ2φ2/(4γ) − (1−
λ)2(1 − φ)φ/(2γ). The expected profits of the firm are: V ∗∅,S = λ
2φ(2 − φ)/(4γ) + (1 −
λ)2(1− φ2)/(4γ).
Comparing the profits with and without a covenant, we have the following result:
Lemma 5 Under spot contracting, the firm chooses to have a covenant not to compete if
and only if
φ ≥ 2bfb(λ).
Proof. Follows directly from comparing profits above.
In order to understand the lemma, note that the condition φ ≥ 2bfb(λ) is equivalent to
λ ≤ eλ(φ), where eλ(φ) (with ∂eλ/∂φ > 0) is implicitly given by φ = 2λ2λ2+(1−λ)2 . In general,
the firm chooses a covenant if the eﬀort of the employee is relatively unimportant for the
R&D outcome (λ low) and competition in the product market is weak (φ is high). In this
case, the employee would be paid too high a reward for an innovation if there were no
CNC, and this would destroy the (more important) incentives of the firm.22 This result
is in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986) showing that the residual rights of control
should be owned by the party whose investment is more important.23
In the base model, where only the employee’s eﬀort matters for R&D (λ = 1), it is
optimal to have no CNC to provide incentives to the employee. In the other extreme case
where only the firm’s investment matters (λ = 0), it is optimal to have a covenant, because
22Notice that 1
2
≥ φ ≥ 2b∗ is feasible if and only if λ ≤ (
√
3− 1)/2.
23Unlike Grossman and Hart, in this paper there is not a choice between giving the control rights to
either the firm or the employee. Rather, there is a choice between giving the control rights to the firm (a
covenant) or sharing them (no covenant).
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it maximizes the incentives of the firm by minimizing the reward to the employee. (This
is easily seen from Lemma 5 as bfb = 0 for λ = 0.)
3.3 Relational contracts
We now consider the possibility of relational contracts. Reassuringly, the conclusion of
Lemma 5 will not change. It is optimal to include a CNC in the employment contract
if and only if φ ≥ 2bfb. However, the analysis of relational contracts with two-sided
investment is rather long, so the reader may consider skipping it at a first reading.
3.3.1 A covenant not to compete
In the analysis, we need to consider φ < 2bfb and φ ≥ 2bfb separately, as the spot contract
that the firm would choose after reneging on the relational contract is diﬀerent (see Lemma
5).
A covenant, for φ < 2bfb The problem of the firm is
maxb,s V (b, s) =
©
λ2b(1− b)/(2γ) + (1− λ)2(1− b)2/(4γ)− s
ª
, subject to the employee’s
participation constraint λ2b2/(4γ) + (1− λ)2(1− b)b/(2γ) + s ≥ 0 and the firm’s incentive
constraint
³
V (b, s)− V ∗∅,S
´
/r ≥ b. This can be rewritten as:
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1r
¡
V (b)− V ∗∅,S
¢
≥ b (3)
Except for both parties investing, the problem of the firm is the same as in the base
model. Solving the program, we obtain:
Lemma 6 (Relational contract and a covenant not to compete)
For φ ≤ 2bfb, the optimal relational contract with a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ λ24γ
³
1− φbfb
´2
≡ rfb, then b∗ = bfb (the relational contract attains first best).
ii. If rfb < r ≤ λ
2
2γ
µ
1−
q
φ
bfb (2−
φ
bfb )
¶
≡ rsb, then
b∗ = bsb ≡ bfb
·
1− 1λ2
µ
2γr − λ2
q
φ
bfb (2−
φ
bfb ) +
¡
1− 2γrλ2
¢2¶¸
(the relational contract
attains second best).
iii. If r > rsb, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Proof. In appendix.
As expected, a decrease in the interest rate and a decrease in φ make the relational
contract more likely to be sustained, as they make less attractive for the firm to renege on
the contract and continue the relation with a spot contract (and no covenant). One can
check that for λ = 1 (which implies bfb = 1), Lemma 6 coincides with Lemma 2 of section
2.
15
A covenant, for φ ≥ 2bfb In this case, the only diﬀerence is that after a deviation
the firm would keep the covenant. Hence, its program is:
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1r
¡
V (b)− V ∗CNC,S
¢
≥ b. (4)
Lemma 7 (Relational contract and a covenant not to compete)
For φ > 2bfb, the optimal relational contract with a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ λ24γ ≡ rfb, then b
∗ = bfb (the relational contract attains first best).
ii. If rfb < r ≤ λ
2
2γ ≡ rsb, then b∗ = bsb ≡ 2bfb
¡
1− 2γrλ2
¢
(the relational contract attains
second best).
iii. If r > rsb, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Proof. In appendix.
Notice that φ does not enter the conditions in Lemma 7: the firm would keep the CNC
even after reneging on the contract, so φ does not aﬀect the profits from reneging.
3.3.2 No covenant
Like in the previous case, we distinguish between φ ≤ 2bfb and φ > 2bfb.
No covenant, for φ ≤ 2bfb We have to consider two sub-cases here. The first one
is the case where φ ≤ bfb. Here, a relational contract can only be sustained if b > φ, as
a spot contract would otherwise do better. The second one is the case where φ > bfb. In
this case, the optimal bonus must be such b < φ, which will raise some new issues: since
the outside oﬀer is higher than the bonus. Let us start with the first sub-case.
No covenant, for φ ≤ bfb The problem facing the firm is similar to (3), except for
the incentive constraint, as the firm has to pay φ to keep the employee after reneging on
the contract:
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1r
¡
V (b)− V ∗∅,S
¢
≥ b− φ. (5)
The next lemma states the results in this case:
Lemma 8 (Relational contract and no covenant not to compete)
For φ ≤ bfb, the optimal relational contract without a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ λ24γ
³
1− φbfb
´
≡ rfb, then b∗ = bfb (the relational contract attains first best).
ii. If rfb < r ≤
bfb(bfb−φ)
2γλ2 ≡ rsb, then b
∗ = bsb ≡ 2bfb − φ− 4γrλ
2
bfb (the relational contract
attains second best).
iii. If r > rsb, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Proof. In appendix.
One can check that the critical values which satisfy Lemma 8 are identical to those
found in the base model in section 2 for the special case of λ = 1.
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No covenant, for bfb < φ ≤ 2bfb As anticipated above, there are new issues arising
for φ > bfb. A relational contract is only sustainable if it allows the firm to pay a bonus
that is lower than φ and to strike a better balance between the incentives of the firm and
the employee.24 This, however, raises the problem that the employee may leave for the
rival even if oﬀered the bonus. Indeed, if the employee earned a zero expected wage every
period, as it was the case up to now, he would find it optimal to reject the bonus and take
the outside oﬀer.
The only way to implement a relational contract with b < φ is thus to ensure that
the employee earns rents from staying in the relation.25 The employee may then accept
the bonus, even if the outside oﬀer is higher, because leaving would imply giving up the
future rents from the relation. Therefore, the firm oﬀers a contract that gives rents to the
employee once the relation is running. However, the firm takes away these expected rents
through a time 0 payment of e from the employee to the firm.26
In principle, the firm could make the employee stay for any bonus by making the future
rents suﬃciently high. However, following the literature (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989)), we assume that both parties can terminate the relation. Paying rents to employee
introduces therefore an incentive problem on the side of the firm: the firm may choose to
cash-in e and afterwards terminate the relation (and continue with a spot contract).
The following lemma shows that the firm’s program with the new constraints can be
simplified considerably:
Lemma 9 If bfb < φ ≤ 2bfb and there is no CNC, the problem of the firm, when choosing
the optimal relational contract, reduces to:
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1r
¡
V (b)− V ∗∅,S
¢
≥ φ− b. (6)
Proof. In appendix.
The next lemma characterizes the optimal relational contract for bfb < φ ≤ 2bfb:
Lemma 10 (Relational contract and no covenant not to compete)
For bfb < φ ≤ 2bfb, the optimal relational contract without a covenant is characterized as
follows:
i. If r ≤ λ24γ
³
φ
bfb − 1
´
≡ rfb, then b∗ = bfb (the relational contract attains first best).
ii. If rfb < r ≤ λ
2
2γ
³
φ
bfb − 1
´
≡ rsb, then b∗ = bsb ≡ 2bfb − φ + 4γrb
fb
λ2 (the relational
contract attains second best).
iii. If r > rsb, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Proof. In appendix.
24 In the base model, it would be optimal (if incentive compatible) to make the employee the residual
claimant, i.e. bfb = 1. Therefore, the outside oﬀer was never too high. Here, where both parties invest,
this is possible. For example, if φ ≥ bfb, the outside oﬀer over-rewards the employee and under-rewards
the firm relative to first best.
25Note that a bonus b > φ could not be optimal: the firm would be better oﬀ using a spot contract,
which would give the employee a reward φ for his successful eﬀort.
26 In the previous cases considered, there was no problem of the employee rejecting the bonus. The
contracts considered here would therefore not have lead to a more eﬃcient outcome.
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No covenant, for φ > 2bfb Notice that there is no relational contract with b > φ,
as this would be dominated by a spot contract. To sustain a relational contract with b < φ
the firm has to guarantee some rents to the employee in each period - while appropriating
them at period t = 0. One has then to consider a larger set of constraints, like in the
previous case. Fortunately, the problem of the firm simplifies to:
Lemma 11 If φ > 2bfb and there is no CNC, the problem of the firm, when choosing the
optimal relational contract, reduces to:
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1r
¡
V (b)− V ∗CNC,S
¢
≥ φ− b. (7)
Proof. In appendix.
The following lemma summarizes the results:
Lemma 12 (Relational contract and no covenant not to compete)
For φ ≥ 2bfb, the optimal relational contract without a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ λ24γ
³
bfb
φ−bfb
´
≡ rfb, then b∗ = bfb (the relational contract attains first best).
ii. If rfb < r ≤ λ
2
2γ
µ
φ
bfb − 1−
r
φ
bfb
³
φ
bfb − 2
´¶
≡ rsb, then
b∗ = bsb ≡ bfb
·
1− 1λ2
µq¡
λ2 + 2γr
¢2 − 4γrλ2bfb − 2γr¶¸ (the relational contract attains
second best).
iii. If r > rsb, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Proof. In appendix.
3.4 The optimal choice of a covenant
We are ready to consider the firm’s choice of whether including a covenant not to compete
in the contract. For λ = 0, a spot contract with a covenant achieves the first best, so there
is no role for a relational contract. In the following, we thus focus on λ > 0.
First, consider φ ≤ bfb. Under relational contracting, the firm maximizes V (b). The
constraint on the firm’s problem depends on whether there is a covenant or not:¡
V (b)− V ∗∅,S
¢
/r ≥ b− φ (no covenant), or
¡
V (b)− V ∗∅,S
¢
/r ≥ b (covenant).
The constraint is laxer if there is no covenant, as the firm has to compete with the rival
to keep the employee if it reneges on the bonus. It follows from Lemma 6 and 8 that a
relational contract is easier to sustain and is more eﬃcient without a CNC. Furthermore,
since the firm prefers no CNC also under spot contracting, it is never optimal to include
a covenant in the contract.
Lemma 13 For φ < bfb, it is (weakly) optimal for the firm not to include a CNC in the
contract.
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Proof. In appendix.
Consider now bfb ≤ φ ≤ 2bfb. The argument follows closely the one above. Under
relational contracting, the firm maximizes V (b), subject to the following constraints:¡
V (b)− V ∗∅,S
¢
/r ≥ φ− b (no covenant), or
¡
V (b)− V ∗∅,S
¢
/r ≥ b (covenant).
It can be checked that the constraint is again laxer if there is no covenant. Hence, as
for φ ≤ bfb, the firm chooses to have no CNC:
Lemma 14 For bfb ≤ φ ≤ 2bfb, it is (weakly) optimal for the firm not to include a CNC
in the contract.
Proof. Omitted as it follows the same steps as the proof of Lemma 13.
The next lemma shows that it is optimal to include a CNC in the contract for φ ≥ 2bfb.
The intuition is that the outside oﬀer drives up the bonus in the relational contract when
there is no covenant (to avoid the employee leaving). The employee thus receives too
strong incentives, and the firm too weak, relative to the first best.
Under the relational contract the firm chooses b to maximize the same function V (b),
subject to the following constraints:¡
V (b)− V ∗CNC,S
¢
/r ≥ φ− b (no covenant), or
¡
V (b)− V ∗CNC,S
¢
/r ≥ b (covenant).
In this region, however, the constraint is laxer under the covenant, as φ−b ≥ b, so relational
contracts work better. In addition, we know from Lemma 5 that with spot contracts the
covenant gives the firm a higher payoﬀ. Arguing as above, it follows that it is optimal to
impose a covenantfor all interest rates.
Lemma 15 For φ ≥ 2bfb, it is (weakly) optimal for the firm to include a CNC in the
contract.
Proof. Omitted as it follows the same steps as the proof of Lemma 13.
The next proposition summarizes this rather long analysis.
Proposition 2 It is optimal to include a CNC in the employment contract if and only if
φ > 2bfb.
The inclusion of relational contracts does not change the conclusion obtained under
spot contracting. It is optimal to include a covenant not to compete in the contract if the
employee’s eﬀort is relatively unimportant compared to the investment of the firm.
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4 Robustness of the results
In this section, we relax some of the assumptions made (one at a time) in the model.
To do so, we return to the base model of section 2, that allows for a simpler treatment
than the general case. First, we examine the case where the eﬃciency eﬀect does not hold
(φ > 12); second, we study the case where the employee is credit constrained; third, we
discuss alternative assumptions about the nature of the hiring process; fourth, we consider
a variant of the model where the employee can choose among diﬀerent projects; fifth, we
briefly discuss the case of asymmetric information between the firms.
4.1 The eﬃciency eﬀect does not hold (φ > 1
2
)
Up to now, we have considered only the case where the so-called eﬃciency eﬀect holds.
Now, we analyze the case where φ > 12 . Here, the outside firm has the highest valuation
of the employee (said otherwise, the firm loses relatively little from letting the employee
go). If the employee is free to leave, the outside firm (Firm 2) hires the employee paying
a wage of 1 − φ. If the employee cannot leave, either because of a CNC or because it
has accepted a bonus, Firm 2 gives a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to Firm 1.27 In equilibrium,
Firm 2 hires the employee paying 1− φ to Firm 1. The outside firm thus always hires the
employee paying 1 − φ. However, the payment goes to the employee only if he is free to
leave. Otherwise, it goes to the firm.
Spot contracts Following an innovation, the employee receives a wage of 0 if there is
a covenant and 1 − φ if there is none. Therefore, the eﬀort of the employee is 0 and
(1− φ)/(2γ) with and without a covenant, respectively. Proceeding as in the base model,
we have:
V ∗CNC,S = 0 and V ∗∅,S =
1− φ2
4γ .
Hence, the firm prefers to have no CNC under spot contracting. Notice that V ∗∅,S ,
unlike in section 2, is decreasing in φ. The reason is that the wage is decreasing in φ,
which in turn decreases the eﬀort of the employee.28 In the limit, φ = 1, the firm is not
willing to pay anything, as the outside firm uses the innovation in an independent product
market. Therefore, the employee receives a zero wage, also if there is no CNC, and exerts
no eﬀort.
Relational contracts First, we look at relational contracts where a CNC is included.
The problem of choosing the optimal contract is similar to the one in the base model. As
27The results are robust to diﬀerent specifications of the bargaining game as long as the employee earns
a lower wage with a CNC than without; see discussion in next subsection.
28 Suppose that the employee’s outside option instead would be to set up his own business. Disregarding
any fixed costs of starting the business, this option would have the value φ (i.e., the duopoly profits).
For φ ≤ 1/2, it doesn’t matter whether the outside option is to start up a business or to leave for a
competitor. For φ > 1/2, however, the value of the outside option is decreasing in φ if the employee
receives an oﬀer from a competitor whereas it is increasing if the employee can start up a new business.
However, considering a start-up as the outside option would not aﬀect the basic trade-oﬀ between having
a CNC or not.
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before, the key constraint is the incentive constraint of the firm. Suppose thus that an
innovation has been made. If the firm pays the bonus, the employee always accepts it, as
he cannot threaten to leave for a competitor. Afterwards, the outside firm oﬀers to pay
1 − φ to hire the employee. Since the employee has been paid the bonus, it is the firm
that decides whether to accept or reject this oﬀer. It will accept, as the eﬃciency eﬀect
does not hold. Hence, the firm lets the employee go, and hires another worker to do the
production. In the present period, the firm earns: −b+ 1− φ+ φ = 1− b. The following
period, the firm can start a relational contract with another worker, as it has honored the
contract and kept its reputation intact. If the firm does not pay the bonus, the firm earns
1 this period (i.e., 1− φ+ φ). However, it has lost its reputation in the labor market and
has to continue with a spot contract. The problem of the firm is thus:
max
b
VCNC,R(b) =
b(2− b)
4γ subject to: VCNC,R(b) ≥ rb+ V
∗
∅,S
The next lemma states the solution to this program. Since the program is almost
identical to the one in section 2, the proof has been left out.
Lemma 16 (Relational contract and a covenant not to compete) For φ > 1/2, the optimal
relational contract with a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ φ
2
4γ ≡ brfb, then b∗ = 1 (the relational contract attains first best29).
ii. If brfb < r ≤ 1−√1−φ22γ ≡ bro, then b∗ = bb = 1 − 2γr +q(1− 2γr)2 − 1 + φ2 (the
relational contract attains second best)
iii. If r > bro, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
We now turn to contracts where there is no CNC. Consider the incentive constraint of
the firm. If the firm pays the bonus, the profits are the same as with a CNC. If the firm does
not pay the bonus, they are not. In this case, the firm loses the employee to the outside
firm and earns duopoly profits in the present period. Afterwards, the firm continues with
a spot contract because no worker in the pool is willing to accept a relational contract.
The problem of the firm is thus:
max
b
VCNC,R(b) = V∅,R(b) =
b(2− b)
4γ subject to: 1− b+
VCNC,R(b)
r ≥ φ+
V ∗∅,S
r
The firm earns monopoly profits after reneging on the bonus if there is a CNC, but only
duopoly profits if there is no CNC. Therefore, the incentive constraint of the firm is laxer
if there is no CNC. The study of the firm’s program when there is no covenant is very
similar to the program analyzed in section 2, and we omit the derivation.
Lemma 17 (Relational contract and no covenant) For φ > 1/2, the optimal relational
contract without a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ φ4γ ≡ erfb, then b∗ = 1 (the relational contract attains first best).
29The first best eﬀort is here defined as the one that maximizes the profits of Firm 1. For φ > 1/2,
however, Firm 2 also benefits from the innovation. The bonus that maximizes the joint profits of the two
firms is thus b = 2φ.
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ii. If erfb < r ≤ φ2γ ≡ ero, then b∗ = bb = 1 + φ− 4γr (the relational contract attains second
best)
iii. If r > ero, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
Armed with these results, we can now proceed to confirm the main result that we
obtained in section 2:
Proposition 3 For φ > 1/2, it is always (weakly) better for the firm not to include a
covenant not to compete in the employment contract.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 3 summarizes the analysis for φ > 1/2 where the employee leaves for the
outside firm and technology spillovers arise. It is optimal, as it is for φ ≤ 1/2, not to
include a CNC in the employment contract. The employee exerts a higher eﬀort under
spot contracting if there no CNC. Furthermore, it is easier to sustain a relational contracts
if there is no CNC, as it is more costly for the firm to renege on the contract.
Note that for φ > 1/2 job turnover arises in equilibrium, whereas it did not in the base
model. Therefore, it is not the actual job turnover that matters, but rather the possibility
of it.
4.2 Credit constrained employee
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the firm can extract all rents by using a
negative, fixed wage. In this section, we study the case where the employee is wealth and
credit constrained. In particular, we assume that the firm has to oﬀer a wage s ≥ 0 every
period.30 This can also be thought of as a situation where there is a minimum wage of 0.
We consider only φ ≤ 1/2.
Spot contracts The employee receives an additional wage of φ if it makes an innovation
and there is no CNC. Therefore, it exerts the eﬀort φ/(2γ). The firm can no longer extract
all rents ex-ante, but it chooses the lowest fixed wage possible, s = 0. The employee
chooses a = 0, if there is a CNC, as an innovation does not increase the employee’s wage
bill. Hence, s = 0 is optimal. From this discussion follows:
V ∗CNC,S = 0 and V ∗∅,S =
φ(1− φ)
2γ .
Under spot contracting, it is thus optimal to have no covenant, as the employee otherwise
chooses the minimal eﬀort.
30Another possibility is that the employee is credit constrained at the beginning of the game, but not
necessarily later if he is successful and earns more than the expected wage of 0. This problem is technically
quite diﬃcult, as it is not stationary, so we restrict attention to the simpler variant where s ≥ 0 every
period. This can be thought of as the other extreme case relative to the base model where the employee
is credit constrained in any one period. Our speculation is that the results would not change qualitatively
in an intermediate situation where the credit constraint depends on the history of outcomes.
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Relational contracts Suppose that there is a CNC in place. The employee is paid
b if he innovates and chooses the eﬀort b/(2γ). The firm oﬀers s = 0 to minimize the
employee’s rents. Therefore, the expected profits per period are (1− b)b/(2γ). The bonus
that solves the unconstrained problem of the firm is b = 1/2. Since the firm cannot use
the fixed wage to extract the surplus of the employee, it oﬀers a lower bonus in order to
capture some of the rents created by the innovation. (Indeed, if it oﬀered b = 1, which
is the first best bonus when the employee is not credit constrained, it would earn zero
profits). Abusing notation slightly, we denote bfb = 1/2 the first best bonus, as it solves
the firm’s unconstrained problem.
The firm’s incentive constraint has the same form as in the base model, so the problem
of the firm can be written as:
max
b
VCNC,R(b) =
b(1− b)
2γ subject to: VCNC,R(b)− V
∗
∅,S ≥ rb.
The following lemma summarizes the solution to this program:
Lemma 18 (Relational contract with a covenant and a credit constrained employee) For
1/2 ≥ φ, the optimal relational contract with a covenant is characterized as follows:
i. If r ≤ (1−2φ)
2
4γ ≡ brfb, then b∗ = 1/2 (the relational contract attains first best given the
credit constraint).
ii. If r ≤ 1−2
√
φ(1−φ)
2γ ≡ bro, then b∗ = bbo = µ1− 2γr +q(1− 2γr)2 − 4φ(2− φ)¶ /2 (the
relational contract attains second best).
iii. If r > bro, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
If there is no covenant, it is costlier to renege on the bonus, as the firm has to pay φ
to keep the employee. Therefore, the problem of the firm is:
max
b
VCNC,R(b) =
b(1− b)
2γ subject to: VCNC,R(b)− V
∗
∅,S ≥ r(b− φ).
The solution to this program is:
Lemma 19 (Relational contract, without covenant and with a credit constrained em-
ployee) For 1/2 ≥ φ, the optimal relational contract without a covenant is characterized as
follows:
i. If r ≤ 1−2φ4γ ≡ erfb, then b∗ = 1/2 (the relational contract attains first best given the
credit constraint).
ii. If r ≤ 1−2φ2γ ≡ ero, then ebo = 1− 2γr − φ (the relational contract attains second best)
iii. If r > ero, then the problem has no solution (only spot contracts exist).
The next proposition shows that it is optimal not to include a CNC in the employment
contract. (We omit the proof because it follows the same steps as above.)
Proposition 4 Suppose that the employee is wealth and credit constrained and 1/2 ≤ φ.
Then, it is always (weakly) better for the firm not to include a covenant not to compete in
the employment contract.
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As above, the intuition is that having no covenant both relaxes the firm’s incentive
constraint under relational contracting and gives the employee better incentives under
spot contracting. The outcome is less eﬃcient if the employee is credit constrained, as the
firm has to oﬀer a lower bonus to capture some of the rents accruing from the innovation,
but it does not change the conclusion of the base model that it is optimal not to include
a CNC in the contract.
4.3 Diﬀerent bargaining rules
We have sofar modeled the hiring process of the employee as a first price auction. In this
section we show that our qualitative results (in particular, about the eﬀect of CNCs) are
robust to diﬀerent assumptions concerning the bargaining game. We restrict attention to
φ ≤ 1/2 and assume that the employee is not credit constrained. The eﬀects at play are
easily understood from the base model, so we keep the analysis verbal.
Under spot contracting, the bargaining game is irrelevant if there is a covenant in place.
Firm 1 has the highest valuation of the employee, so there are no gains from trade to be
realized. Hence, after an innovation is made, Firm 1 keeps the employee without paying
anything. Foreseeing this, the employee exerts no eﬀort and V ∗CNC,S = 0.
When there is no CNC, the bargaining rule aﬀects the solution under spot contracting.
The employee receives an outside oﬀer of φ from Firm 2. However, he may try to increase
his wage further by threatening to leave. If the employee leaves, both the firm and the
employee receive φ. If, on the other hand, the employee stays, the firm earns monopoly
profits of 1. Depending on the bargaining power of the two parties, the employee obtains
a wage w ∈ [φ, 1 − φ].31 ,32 The employee exerts the eﬀort w/(2γ), which is greater than
(or equal to) the eﬀort in the base model. The profits of the firm are also higher: V ∗∅,S =
w(2− w)/(4γ) ≥ φ(2− φ)/(4γ). The conclusion of section 2 that it is optimal to have no
CNC under spot contracting holds thus a fortiori.
Under relational contracting, a diﬀerent bargaining rule aﬀects the incentive constraint
of the firm. The incentive constraint is VCNC,R(b) − V ∗∅,S(w) ≥ rb if there is a CNC
and V∅,R(b) − V ∗∅,S(w) ≥ r(b − w) if there is none. A higher wage aﬀects the incentive
constraints through two channels. First, by increasing the spot market payoﬀ, V ∗∅,S , it
makes the incentive constraint tighter with and without a covenant. Second, if there is
31There are, as mentioned in text, other equilibria in the first price auction than the one considered.
These involve: Firm 2 bidding between its own and Firm 1’s evaluation of the employee (i.e., w ∈ [φ, 1−φ]);
Firm 1 matching the bid of Firm 2. Up to now, we have ignored these equilibria, as they are in weakly
dominated strategies. The analysis in this section deals with alternative bargaining rules, but it can be
reinterpreted as the outcome if these other equilibria are played.
32We have assumed that the firm keeps the innovation if the employee leaves. In some circumstances, it
may be diﬃcult for the firm to recover the innovation (it would be, for example, very diﬃcult to force an
employee to reveal a new idea that exists only inside his head). This section can thus be interpreted as a
situation where, if the employee leaves, the firm risks losing the innovation. To see this, suppose that if the
employee leaves, the firm keeps the innovation only with the probability 1− θ. The value of the employee
who has made an innovation is thus 1− (1− θ)φ for Firm 1. The value of the employee is θ+ (1− θ)φ for
Firm 2. If there is a CNC in place, Firm 1 keeps the employee paying nothing additional. If there is no
CNC, Firm 1 also keeps the employee but has to pay w(θ) = θ + (1− θ)φ > φ.
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no covenant, a higher wage increases the cost of keeping the employee after reneging on
the bonus (w on the right hand side of the constraint). This is a countervailing eﬀect that
makes the incentive constraint slacker. In total, the incentive constraint is tighter if the
wage is higher both with and without a CNC.33 However, the relational contract without
a covenant still does better than the contract with a covenant due to the second eﬀect. A
higher wage decreases the profits under relational contracting, but it does not change the
relative ranking between a relational contract with and without a CNC.
Finally, proceeding as above, it can be shown that it is optimal not to include a CNC
in the contract for all interest rates, because it does better both under spot and relational
contracting.
4.4 Project selection
We have assumed so far that the employee decides on the eﬀort he makes, but not on the
type of project he works on. In some cases, however, he might be able to choose between
diﬀerent projects. This gives rise to the problem that the employee might choose a project
that has a lower value for the firm but a higher value for outside firms, thus increasing
his expected wage via better outside oﬀers. This is only a problem when no covenant is
in place, as the outside value of the innovation otherwise does not aﬀect the wage. The
possible bias in project selection therefore tilts the trade-oﬀ between covenants and no
covenants in favor of the former.
To formalize these statements, consider the following extension of the base model of
section 2. The employee can either choose to work on the ’good’ project, which is the same
as before, or on the ’bad’ project. The bad project gives rise to monopoly profits of 1−∆
for Firm 1 and 1 + ∆ for Firm 2. The corresponding duopoly profits are φ(1 − ∆) and
φ(1+∆). The employee chooses as before the probability of success ai where i indicates the
type project chosen, i ∈ {b(ad), g(ood)}. The cost of eﬀort is γ(ai)2. To keep close to the
base model where spillovers do not arise in equilibrium, consider the case φ < (1−∆)/2.
Here, Firm 1 retains the employee by matching his outside oﬀer of φ(1 +∆).
4.4.1 Spot contracts
Under spot contracting, no covenant is used in equilibrium, as the employee otherwise
would make zero eﬀort. The employee chooses the bad project because it gives the highest
wage and makes the eﬀort ab = φ(1 + ∆)/(2γ). The firm has profits of eVφ,s = φ(1 −
∆2)/(2γ)−φ2(1+∆)2/(4γ). Note that ∂ eVφ,s/∂∆ < 0, so the bad project is less profitable
than the good one. Therefore, relational contracts are easier to sustain when the employee
can choose the bad project, because profits under spot contracting are reduced.34
33Consider the contract with no CNC. Following the step in previous section, it can be shown that
a relational contract exists if and only if r ≤ (1 − w)/2γ. However, for these parameters, we have:
∂(V∅,R(b)− V ∗∅,S − r(b−w))/∂w < 0. Hence, the incentive constraint is tighter for w > φ. The first eﬀect
thus always dominates the second.
34 See Baker et al. (2001) for a complete analysis of spot vs. relational contracts when multi-tasking is
allowed (our example is a special case of their analysis).
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4.4.2 Relational contracts
If the contract includes a CNC, the employee has no incentive to engage in the less pro-
ductive project. The firm’s problem is thus
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1− b+ V (b)/r ≥ 1 + eVφ,s/r
If the employee is not bound by a covenant, he might wish to renege on the relational
contract and choose the bad project in order to get a higher outside oﬀer. This introduces
a new incentive constraint: the employee must prefer the good project to the bad. There
are two cases that we need to consider separately.
Case 1: b ≥ φ(1 + ∆) Here, the bonus is higher than the outside oﬀer even if the
employee chooses the bad project. As long as the relational contract is sustainable, the
employee has no incentive to choose the bad project. Therefore, the problem of the firm
is:
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1− b+ V (b)/r ≥ 1− φ+ eVφ,s/r.
We see that in this case, as in the base model, no covenant relaxes the incentive
constraint of the firm. Hence, in this range of parameter values, which will be sustained
by a low enough discount rate r, the firm does not choose the covenant.
Case 2: b < φ(1 +∆) Here, the firm cannot extract all rents from the employee in each
period through the fixed wage s. If it did so, the employee would choose the bad project
and earn positive rents in the present period. Instead, the firm has to devise a more
sophisticated contract where the employee is left some rents in each period (enough to
induce the good project), and extract all these rents ex-ante through an upfront payment
e from the employee.
The firm’s problem becomes:
max
b,e,s
{((1 + r)/r) (b(1− b)/(2γ)− s) + e} subject to :
((1 + r)/r)
¡
b2/(4γ) + s
¢
− e ≥ 0 (i),
b2/(4γ) + s ≥ 0 (ii),
b(1− b)/(2γ)− s− eVφ,s ≥ 0 (iii),³
b(1− b)/(2γ)− s− eVφ,s´ /r − (b− φ) ≥ 0 (iv),
b− φ+ 1r
¡
b2/(4γ) + s
¢
/r ≥ 0 (v),
((1 + r)/r)(b2/(4γ) + s)− (φ2(1 +∆)2/(4γ) + s) ≥ 0 (vi).
Lemma 9 in section 3 has already studied a very similar problem, and a discussion of
the constraints can be found there. The only novelty here is constraint (vi), which makes
sure that the employee prefers to continue the relational contract and choose the good
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project. It can be shown, proceeding as in Lemma 9, that for φ ≤ b < φ(1 + ∆) this
problem reduces to the following:
max
b
V (b) subject to: 1− b+ V (b)/r ≥ 1− φ+
¡
φ2(1 +∆)2 − b2
¢
/(4γ) + eVφ,s/r.
It is then clear that the incentive constraint under a covenant is slacker if
−φ+
¡
φ2(1 +∆)2 − b2
¢
/(4γ) ≥ 0. In the interval considered, this is true for low values of
b but false for high values of b. For instance, if b = φ the inequality holds, but if b is close
to φ(1 +∆) it does not.
Summarizing this analysis, we have that for low values of r where a relational contract
with a high bonus can be sustained, the firm will choose not to have the covenant. For high
values of r, the firm will also not have the covenant, as only spot contracts can be used.
However, for some intermediate values of r where a relational contract can be sustained,
but only with a relatively low bonus, it might be optimal to introduce a covenant to make
sure that the employee works on the right project.
4.5 Asymmetric information
In the base model, we assume that both the current employer, Firm 1, and its competitor,
Firm 2, perfectly observe whether the employee has come up with an innovation or not,
a strong assumption that deserves some comment. First, note that we assume that the
worker might leave for another firm, but we might have chosen to have him set up his own
firm without upsetting the main results of the analysis, namely the comparison between
covenants and no covenants (some comments to this eﬀect have been made earlier in this
section). Clearly, in the case of a start-up asymmetric information would not be an issue.
Second, even without entering a formal analysis that would be demanding, we can still
get some ideas about how asymmetric information could modify the analysis in the case
Firm 1 and 2 compete for the worker. Suppose that in an equilibrium with asymmetric
information the employee would be oﬀered w ∈ (0, φ) in expected terms from Firm 2. In
this case, the basic mechanism emphasized sofar would still play a role: the outside oﬀer
would induce the worker to make higher eﬀort and would relax the commitment problem
of the firm, although to a smaller extent than in the case of perfect information. It is
only if Firm 2 was completely unaware of the innovation, and would be unwilling to make
any oﬀer to the employee, that there would be no diﬀerence between covenants and no
covenants.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the role of covenants not to compete in a model where an employee’s
eﬀort is not observable (i.e., there is moral hazard) and the realization of the R&D outcome
is observable by all parties but not contractible.
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Using this framework, we have shown that when the employee’s contribution to the
innovation is large enough, a covenant not to compete unambiguously reduces the em-
ployee’s eﬀort, the expected number of innovations made, and the firm’s profits. This
result holds good both when the contract between the firm and the employee contains
only explicit elements (a spot contract) and when it contains an implicit promise of a
bonus (a relational contract). The intuition is that having no covenant forces the firm to
reward the employee when an innovation is made, as he otherwise walks away to a rival
firm. It alleviates thus a commitment problem on the side of the firm and allows for a
more profitable, higher powered incentive scheme. However, when the firm’s investment
is more important than the employee’s, there exists a rationale for including a covenant
in the contract: since it prevents the employee from leaving for a competitor, a covenant
ensures the appropriability of the firm’s investment and favors innovation.
Our paper suggests that not to have covenants in employment contracts might in some
circumstances induce more eﬀort, thus providing a rationale for the idea that (actual or
potential) labor mobility fosters innovations. However, in our setting firms’ incentives are
aligned with social interest, and firms should be left free to include restrictive covenants
or not. In other words, we provide no justification for a policy that prevents firms from
using covenants.
Admittedly, though, our analysis does not capture some eﬀects that covenants might
have. It is conceivable that they might hinder positive externalities in the form of workers
spreading knowledge from one firm to another in a way that is not internalized by em-
ployers. Such ex-post eﬀects might be important, but we have purposely focused on the
ex-ante (incentive) eﬀects of covenants.35 A richer setting would be needed if one was to
consider both ex-ante and ex-post eﬀects of the covenants, and carry out a full welfare
analysis.
Further work might be done also along other dimensions. In this paper, we have
considered the eﬀect of CNCs on the eﬀort of the workers, but all workers were assumed
to be identical. New issues would arise if workers had diﬀerent intrinsic abilities. It seems,
for example, plausible that choosing not to adopt CNCs might be a screening device, as
the expected value of the outside oﬀers is greater for high ability workers with a higher
probability of innovating. CNCs may also reduce the incentive to try to signal high ability
in a model with career concerns. While these are interesting questions, they are outside
the scope of this paper.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3
It is straightforward to check that the conditions for the relational contract to hold and to give
rise to the first best are always stricter for the case where a covenant exists: brfb < erfb, andbro < ero. This implies that: (a) When the first best is attained under a covenant, it is attained
under a no covenant regime as well: both regimes give rise to the same eﬀort levels and profits.
(b) There are parameter values where only the second best is attained under a covenant whereas
without a covenant a first best is attained: under the latter regime eﬀort and profit are higher. (c)
When the second best is attained under a covenant, it is attained under a no covenant regime as
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well, but the equilibrium eﬀort under the covenant (bbo) is lower than without the covenant (ebo): :bbc = 1−2γr+q(1− 2γr)2 − 1 + φ2 < ebo = 1−2γr+q(1− 2γr)2 − (1− φ)(1 + φ− 4γr).
Since V (b) is increasing for b < 1, profit are also higher when a covenant does not exist. (d)
There are parameter values where only a fixed wage contract can be attained under a covenant
whereas without a covenant a second best relational contract is attained. Since the latter achieves
positive eﬀort and profit levels, they are higher than under the former, where eﬀort and profit
are zero. (e) There are parameters such that only spot contracts exist, with and without a CNC.
Here, as shown in the main text, it is optimal to have no CNC.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 18
The IC constraint is satisfied for b∗ = 1/2 iﬀ. r ≤ br1. For r > br1, the optimal bonus is
the highest root that solves the IC constraint with equality as it is closest to 1/2. This givesbb0 = µ1− 2γr +q(1− 2γr)2 − 4φ(1− φ)¶ /2. This root exists only if r ≤ br0.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 19
The IC constraint is satisfied for b∗ = 1/2 iﬀ. r ≤ er1. For r > er1, the optimal bonus is
the highest root that solves the IC constraint with equality as it is closest to 1/2. This givesebo = 1− 2γr − φ. This root exists only if r ≤ br0.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
It is straightforward to check that the conditions for the relational contract to hold and to give
rise to the first best are always stricter for the case where a covenant exists: brfb < erfb, andbro < ero. This implies that: (a) When the first best is attained under a covenant, it is attained
under a no covenant regime as well: both regimes give rise to the same eﬀort levels and profits.
(b) There are parameter values where only the second best is attained under a covenant whereas
without a covenant a first best is attained: under the latter regime eﬀort and profit are higher. (c)
When the second best is attained under a covenant, it is attained under a no covenant regime as
well, but the equilibrium eﬀort under the covenant (bbo) is lower than without the covenant (ebo):bbo = µ1− 2γr +q(1− 2γr)2 − 4φ(2− φ)¶ /2 < ebo = 1− 2γr− φ. Since V (b) is increasing
for b < 1/2, profit are also higher when a covenant does not exist. (d) There are parameter values
where only a fixed wage contract can be attained under a covenant whereas without a covenant
a second best relational contract is attained. Since the latter achieves positive eﬀort and profit
levels, they are higher than under the former, where eﬀort and profit are zero. (e) There are
parameters such that only spot contracts exist, with and without a CNC. Here, as shown in the
main text, it is optimal to have no CNC.
6.5 Proof of of Lemma 6.
For b∗ = bfb, the incentive constraint is V (bfb) = b2(λ2/bfb) + φ
¡
φλ2/bfb − 2λ2
¢
+ 2bλ2 ≥
4γbr (since λ2 + (1− λ)2 = 1− 2λ+ 2λ2 = λ2/bfb) which is satisfied iﬀ. r ≤ rfb. For higher
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values of r, b∗ does not satisfy the incentive constraint. Therefore, the firm chooses the highest
possible value of b that satisfies the incentive constraint with equality. This is a standard second
order equation, whose higher root is bsb. This root exists only if r ≤ rsb.
6.6 Proof of Lemma 7
For b∗ = bfb, the incentive constraint is V (bfb) = −b2(1 − λ)2 + bλ2(2 − b) ≥ 4γbr, which
is satisfied iﬀ. r ≤ rfb. For higher values of r, the firm chooses the highest b that satisfies the
incentive constraint with equality, that is bsb. This root exists only if r ≤ rsb.
6.6.1 Proof of Lemma 8
For b∗ = bfb, the incentive constraint is V (bfb) = b2(λ2/bfb) + φ
¡
φλ2/bfb − 2λ2
¢
+ 2bλ2 ≥
4γbr − 4γφr, which is satisfied iﬀ. r ≤ rfb. For higher values of r, the firm chooses the highest
b that satisfies the incentive constraint with equality, which is bsb. Note that it must be bsb ≥ φ,
which leads to r ≤ rsb.
6.7 Proof of Lemma 9
The firm’s problem with these new constraints is:
max
b,e,s
½
1 + r
r
µ
λ2b(1− b)
2γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)2
4γ − s
¶
+ e
¾
(8)
subject to:
1 + r
r
µ
λ2b2
4γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)b
2γ + s
¶
− e ≥ 0 (i)
λ2b2
4γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)b
2γ + s ≥ 0 (ii)
λ2b(1− b)
2γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)2
4γ − s− V
∗
∅,S ≥ 0 (iii)
1
r
µ
λ2b(1− b)
2γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)2
4γ − s− V
∗
∅,S
¶
≥ b− φ (iv)
b− φ+ 1r
µ
λ2b2
4γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)b
2γ + s
¶
≥ 0 (v)
Constraint (i) and (ii) ensure the participation of the employee at time 0 and at time t > 0,
respectively. Constraint (iii) takes care that the firm does not terminate the relation once it
is running. Finally, constraint (iv) and (v) make sure that the firm oﬀers the bonus once an
innovation is made and that the bonus is accepted by the employee. We have left out the time 0
participation constraint of the firm, as it is always satisfied.
In principle, the bonus could be higher or lower than φ. However, b > φ cannot be optimal as
the firm would enjoy higher profit under a spot contract. Therefore, we can restrict our attention
to b < φ.
One can check that (i) has to bind to ensure period 1 participation by the worker. The firm’s
problem can then be written as: maxb V (b) subject to (ii)-(v). First notice that b < φ and (v)
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imply that (ii) is satisfied. Furthermore, b < φ and (iii) imply that (iv) is satisfied. Thus, we only
need to consider constraint (iii) and (v). Denote by si(b) the s that solves constraint (roman)
number i with equality as function of b. A candidate b is feasible if and only if there exists an s
such that (iii) and (v) are satisfied. This is the case if and only if s5(b) ≤ s3(b), which simplifies
to the constraint in Lemma 9.
6.8 Proof of Lemma 10
For b∗ = bfb, the incentive constraint is V (bfb) ≥ 4γφr − 4γbr, which is satisfied iﬀ. r ≤ rfb.
For higher values of r, the firm chooses the lowest b that satisfies the incentive constraint with
equality, which is bsb. Note that it must be bsb ≤ φ, which leads to r ≤ rsb.
6.9 Proof of Lemma 11
The firm’s problem is the same as in Lemma (8), the only diﬀerence being constraints (iii) and
(iv), which are:
λ2b(1− b)
2γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)2
4γ − s−
(1− λ)2
4γ ≥ 0 (iii’),
1
r
µ
λ2b(1− b)
2γ +
(1− λ)2(1− b)2
4γ − s−
(1− λ)2
4γ
¶
≥ b− φ (iv’),
as the firm chooses a CNC under spot contracting. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 9, it can
be shown that constraint (i) binds whereas (ii) and (iv’) do not. Using (i), (iii’), and (v), the
problem reduces to maxb V (b) st. 1r (V (b)− V (φ)) ≥ φ− b.
6.10 Proof of Lemma 12
For b∗ = bfb, the incentive constraint V (bfb) ≥ 4γφr − 4γbr, which is satisfied iﬀ. r ≤ rfb.
For higher values of r, the firm chooses the lowest value of b that satisfies the incentive constraint
with equality. This is a standard second order equation, whose lower root is bsb. This root exists
only if r ≤ rsb.
6.11 Proof of Lemma 13
For r > b
fb(bfb−φ)
2γλ2 , only spot contracts exist, and Lemma 5 establish that no covenants are better
in this region of the parameters’ space. For b
fb(bfb−φ)
2γλ2 ≥ r >
λ2
2γ
µ
1−
q
φ
bfb (2−
φ
bfb )
¶
a second
best relational contract is attained without the covenant, which is better than the spot contract
under the covenant. For λ
2
2γ
µ
1−
q
φ
bfb (2−
φ
bfb )
¶
≥ r > λ24γ (1−
φ
bfb ) relational contracts exist
in both regimes, but a higher bonus is attained without covenant. For λ
2
4γ (1 −
φ
bfb ) ≥ r >
λ2
4γ (1 −
φ
bfb )
2 without covenant the first best is attained, whereas under the covenant only a
second best is. Finally, if r ≤ λ24γ (1−
φ
bfb )
2 the two regimes are equivalent as they both achieve
the first best under the relational contract.
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